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Abstract
It has become commonplace to assert that autonomous agents
will have to be built to follow human rules of behavior–social
norms and laws. But human laws and norms are complex
and culturally varied systems; in many cases agents will have
to learn the rules. This requires autonomous agents to have
models of how human rule systems work so that they can
make reliable predictions about rules. In this paper we con-
tribute to the building of such models by analyzing an over-
looked distinction between important rules and what we call
silly rules —rules with no discernible direct impact on wel-
fare. We show that silly rules render a normative system both
more robust and more adaptable in response to shocks to per-
ceived stability. They make normativity more legible for hu-
mans, and can increase legibility for AI systems as well. For
AI systems to integrate into human normative systems, we
suggest, it may be important for them to have models that
include representations of silly rules.
Introduction
As attention to the challenge of aligning artificial intelli-
gence with human welfare has grown, it has become com-
monplace to assert that autonomous agents will have to
be built to follow human norms and laws (Etzioni and Et-
zioni 2016; Etzioni 2017; IEEE 2018). But this is no easy
task. Human groups are thick with rules and norms about
behavior, many of which are largely invisible, taken for
granted as simply “the way things are done” by partici-
pants (Schutz 1964). They are constituted in complex ways
through second-order normative beliefs: beliefs about what
others believe we should or should not do in some situ-
ation (Bicchieri 2006; 2017). Human laws and norms are
frequently ambiguous and complicated, they vary widely
across jurisdictions, cultures, and groups, they change and
adapt. The cases in which they are reducible to formal rule
statements is the exception. Even deciding whether a vehi-
cle has violated a numerical speed limit is far from straight-
forward: was visibility poor? were there children nearby?
Adding to the complexity, rules and norms are enforced
both by formal institutions like courts and regulators through
costly and error-prone procedures and by the informal be-
havior of agents through third-party criticism and exclu-
sion or internalization and self-criticism. This means that
what actually counts as a rule can easily diverge from an-
nounced or formal rules and that rule-based environments
are complex dynamic systems. As a result, we cannot rely
on formal rules simply being imposed on agents a priori; in-
stead, agents will in many cases have to learn the rules and
how they work in practice. Normativity–the human practice
of classifying some actions as sanctionable and others as
not and then punishing people who engage in sanctionable
conduct–will have to be legible (Dragan and Srinivasa 2013)
to AI systems.
In this paper, we introduce a distinction between types
of rules that can aid in building predictive models to make
human normative systems legible to an AI system. We dis-
tinguish between important rules and silly rules. An impor-
tant rule is one the observance of which by one agent gener-
ates direct payoffs for some other agent(s). When an agent
complies with rules prohibiting speeding, for example, other
agents enjoy a material payoff as a direct consequence, such
as a reduced probability of accident. A silly rule, in contrast,
in one the observance of which by one agent does not gen-
erate any direct material payoff for any other agent. When
an agent violates a dress code, for example, such as by fail-
ing to wear a head covering in public, no-one is materially
affected as a direct consequence of the violation. Observers
might well be offended, and they might punish the violator,
but the violation itself is inconsequential.
We ground our claim that the distinction between silly
and important rules will prove important to building mod-
els for aligned AI using Monte Carlo simulations. We show
that silly rules promote robustness and adaptation in groups.
Silly rules perform a legibility function for humans–making
it easier for them to read the state of the equilibrium in their
group when equilibrium is threatened. Incorporating this in-
sight about silly rules into AI design should allow human
normative systems to be more legible to AI.
Our paper is presented as follows. We first illustrate the
concept of silly rules an example drawn from a concrete en-
vironment. We then develop a model of groups, based on
(Hadfield and Weingast 2012), in which a group of agents
announces a set of rules and relies exclusively on voluntary
third-party punishment by group members to police viola-
tions. We first show formally that, if silly rules are cost-
less, groups with more silly rules achieve higher payoffs.
We then consider the case in which following and punishing
silly rules is costly and present the results of our simulations.
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Our results demonstrate that groups with lots of (sufficiently
cheap) silly rules are more robust: they are able to maintain
more of their population and are less likely to collapse than
groups with fewer silly rules in response to an unfounded
shock to beliefs about the proportion of punishers. Groups
with lots of silly rules are also more adaptable: they collapse
more quickly when there is a true drop in the proportion of
punishers below the threshold that makes group membership
valuable.
Our contributions are threefold. First, we present a formal
model that can account for the presence of silly rules in a
normative system and show the conditions under which silly
rules are likely to exist. This is a contribution to normative
theory in human groups. Second, this work provides an ex-
ample of the importance of building predictive models of hu-
man normative systems qua systems–not merely predicting
the presence of particular norms, which is the dominant ap-
proach taken in the growing literature on AI ethics and align-
ment. Third, we demonstrate that standard AI methods can
be valuable tools in analyzing human normative systems.
What are Silly Rules? A Thought Experiment
from Ethnography
One of the challenges of building models of human nor-
mativity is that as researchers we are all participants in
our taken-for-granted normative environments and this can
make it hard to study norms scientifically (Haidt and Joseph
2008). To attempt to overcome this, we motivate our work
with an example drawn from an ethnography of a group that
engages in practices far removed from the worlds in which
AI researchers live. Moreover, we will use the shocking label
”silly rules” in order to illuminate an overlooked distinction
in the context of the existing literature on normativity. Most
of the social science of norms focuses on functional accounts
of particular norms such as norms of reciprocity, fair shar-
ing of rewards, or non-interference with property. These ac-
counts argue that particular norms evolve because they sup-
port human cooperation and thus improve fitness (Boyd and
Richerson 2009; Tomasello and Vaish 2013) or solve coor-
dination games (Sugden 1986; McAdams and Nadler 2005;
Myerson 2004; McAdams 2015) for example. Our work
highlights the systemic functionality of rules that, individ-
ually, have no direct functionality. All human societies, we
will show, are likely develop silly rules, for good functional
reasons.
Suppose that an AI system were tasked with learning how
to make arrows by observing the Awa´ people of Brazil. The
Awa´ are hunter-gatherers now living in relatively small num-
bers on reservations established by the Brazilian govern-
ment. One of the things the AI will observe, like the ethnog-
raphers who have studied these people, is that the men of the
Awa´ spend four or more hours a day making and repairing
arrows (Gonzlez-Ruibal, Hernando, and Politis 2011). They
are produced in large quantities and need frequent repair.
They are between 1.4 and 1.7 meters in length, customized
to the height of their owner. Bamboo collected to make the
points is sometimes shared but the arrows themselves are
not; they are buried with their owner. The men use only dark,
not brightly colored feathers. All parts of the arrow —shaft,
point, and feathers —are smoked over a grill during prepa-
ration and the arrows themselves are kept warm in smoke at
all times unless they are bundled and put in storage in the
rafters of a hut. Will the AI system reproduce all of these
arrow-making behaviors? We can imagine that AI designed
with principles of inverse reinforcement learning (Ng, Rus-
sell, and others 2000) might discern which behaviors actu-
ally contribute to the functionality of the arrows–which is
presumably what the human designer intended (Hadfield-
Menell et al. 2017). According to the human ethnographers
who observed the Awa´, many of the arrow-making prac-
tices are not functional. Even if smoking the wood used
in the shaft of the arrow during manufacture contributes to
a harder, straighter arrow, smoking the feathers seems un-
necessary, as does ensuring the arrows are kept warm at all
times. Moreover, the men make and carry many more arrows
than they will use. In one season, a total of 402 arrows were
carried on 9 different foraging trips; 9 were used. Most game
on these trips was shot with a shotgun (Gonzlez-Ruibal, Her-
nando, and Politis 2011).
An AI system that ignored the non-functional arrow-
making behaviors, however, would be violating the norms
of the Awa´ people. The arrow-making practices described
above are not just practices; they are rules. They reflect nor-
mative expectations (Bicchieri 2006). How do we know?
The lack of functionality is one clue: the Awa´ presumably
have also discovered that a cold arrow works and that they
spend a lot of time making arrows that go unused and are
damaged by being bundled and carried around. But the bet-
ter evidence comes from how they respond to the only man
who makes his arrows differently. This man is mocked: his
arrows are exceedingly long (2.3 m) and he uses brightly
colored feathers. He is “the only man who does not social-
ize with the rest of the village.” His strange arrows “are an-
other sign of his loss of ‘Awa´-ness’” (Gonzlez-Ruibal, Her-
nando, and Politis 2011). The Awa´’s rules are normative,
moral principles: bright colored feathers are used only by
women to prepare headbands and bracelets used by men in
religious rituals and are associated with the world of spirits
and ancestors; the making of fire and cooking are associ-
ated with masculinity and divinity. An AI system that vio-
lated these rules in the pursuit of arrow-making would not
be aligned with the moral code of the Awa´.
We call the non-functional rules ”silly rules”. We empha-
size that silly rules are not “silly” to the groups that follow
them. They can have considerable meaning, as they do to
the Awa´. Our results will show why silly rules can be very
important to the overall welfare of a group and hence the
subject of intense concern by group members.
Model
Our model is based on a framework developed in (Had-
field and Weingast 2012). We characterize a set of agents
as a group defined by a fixed and common knowledge set of
rules. A rule is a binary classification of alternative actions
that can be taken in carrying out some behavior. Actions are
either “rule violations” or “not rule violations”.
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Members of this group engage in an infinite sequence of
interactions, each of which is governed by a rule drawn ran-
domly from the ruleset. Each interaction is composed of a
randomly selected pair of agents and a third actor, whom we
will call a scofflaw, who will choose either to comply with
the governing rule or not. (For tractability reasons, we do not
model the scofflaws as group members.) One of the agents
is randomly designated as the victim of the rule violation;
the other is a bystander. If a rule is an important rule, the
victim incurs a benefit if the rule is enforced and incurs a
cost if not. If a rule is a silly rule, the victim incurs no bene-
fit from the scofflaw’s compliance with the rule and no cost
from violation.
Group members are of two types in the bystander role:
punishers, who always punish a rule violation, and non-
punishers, who never punish. We assume that groups mem-
bers signal whether they are punishers by paying a signal-
ing cost in each interaction before a potential violation oc-
curs. ((Boyd, Gintis, and Bowles 2010) show that signaling
punisher status supports an evolutionarily stable equilibrium
in which non-punishers cannot free-ride on punisher types.)
The scofflaw complies with the selected rule if the bystander
is a punisher and violates it otherwise. There is no punish-
ment in equilibrium, but the model can be seen as assuming
that victims always punish but punishment is only effective
when bystanders punish as well.
Prior to each interaction, group members have an option
to quit the group and take a risk-free payoff. We formalize
this setup as follows.
Each interaction is a game g and we define the sequence
for a group as a tuple: 〈G,Tθ,Π, U, γ, c〉 whereG is a distri-
bution over games and Tθ is a distribution over punishment
types t in the group, where t = 1 if an agent is a punisher
and t = 0 if not. The proportion of punishers is given by
θ ∈ [0, 1]. For the tractability of our agent models, we treat
Tθ as a static distribution, and assume agents do likewise,
even though it is subject to change as individuals leave the
group.
We will abuse notation somewhat and use T andG to refer
to the support of the corresponding distributions where the
meaning is obvious. Π is each agent’s prior distribution over
the parameters of Tθ, and U : G × Tθ → R is a mapping
from types and games to immediate payoffs for the agents.
γ is each agent’s discount parameter for future rewards. c
expresses a participation cost. This can be understood as the
expected cost of an agent in the bystander role to signal that
she is a punisher to the other agent in an interaction.
Every agent begins in period 1 with perfect knowledge of
how actions are classified, all payoffs, and the distribution
of games. The agents do not know the distribution of types
in the group, but they do hold a prior which we will specify
shortly. The agents update their beliefs about the distribution
of types using Bayes’ rule. The super game is defined as
follows:
For each period j:
1. Each agent chooses whether to participate or not. If an
agent opts out, she collects 0 payoff.
2. All agents that opt in are matched with another agent at
random. A game gj+1 ∼ G is drawn for each of the agent
pairings.
3. Punishers incur a cost c to signal that they will punish
violations. All players observe these signals.
4. In each pairing one agent is randomly assigned the role
of victim, V , and the other the bystander, B. All players
observe the result of this random assignment.
5. All players learn whether the game is a silly or important
game.
6. If B is a punisher, the scofflaw complies with the rule.
Otherwise, the scofflaw violates the rule.
7. Victims and bystanders collect payoffs given by
UV (gj , tB , tV ) and UB(gj , tV , tB).
Agents that play in the bystander role in any game incur no
benefit; they incur the cost c if they are a punisher and 0 if
not. Agents that play in the victim role receive a payoff of
0 in games governed by a silly rule. In games governed by
an important rule they receive a positive reward R, if B is a
punisher and a negative reward, −R, if B is not.
We formalize the set of important games as follows:
G′ = {g ∈ G|U(g, ·) 6= 0}
UV (g, tO, tV |g ∈ G′) = (2tO − 1)R− (2tV − 1)c
UO(g, tO, tV |g ∈ G′) = (2tO − 1)c
We will use EU = Eg,tO [UV (g, tO, tV )|g ∈ G′] to denote
the expected utility of an important game. We let d denote
the density of the process generating games: the probability
of a silly game.
d = 1− P (g ∈ G′); g ∼ G.
Note that a super-game has high density (d close to 1) when
silly rules are a large fraction of the ruleset.
Critically, we ensure that the density of silly games does
not alter the (expected) rate at which important games are
presented to the agents. Rather than take the place of im-
portant interactions, in our model silly interactions increase
the total number of interactions happening in the same time
frame. To be concrete, we assume the expected discounted
reward obtained from important games is independent of d.
This condition can be attained through a suitable modifica-
tion of γ as a function of d:
Proposition 1. Setting
γd = 1− (1− d)(1− γ)
ensures that the expected sum of discounted rewards from
important games is independent of d1.
Proof. See appendix.
It can be easily shown that this constrained model de-
scribes an optimal stopping problem (Gittins, Glazebrook,
and Weber 2011). Each agent in our model must choose
between participating, in which case they get an unknown
reward and learn about the enforcement equilibrium in the
1I[ψ] is the indicator function for the condition ψ.
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Figure 1: The y-axis represents the proportion of the 1000 groups with at least 2 individuals left, where the x-axis represents time in terms
of the number of expected important interactions per agent. The size of the bubbles signifies the average size of the 1000 groups at the given
point in time. 40 linearly spaced values between 0.0 and 0.95 were used for silly rule density, and the graphs for each setting are colored
accordingly. For cost 0.02, we see that high density (blue) groups collapse rapidly, while the lowest density groups (orange) sustain their size
for the duration of the experiment. As the cost comes down, higher density groups start to survive.
community, or opting out, in which case they stop partici-
pating get a constant reward of 0. A classic result from the
literature on optimal stopping tells us that, in the optimal
policy, if the agent opts out once it will opt out for the rest
of time. This is because the agent’s information state does
not change when it chooses to opt out, so if it was optimal
to stop at time t− 1, it will also be optimal to stop at time t.
Thus, we refer to the decision not to participate at any point,
then, as a decision to retire.
These problems broadly fall under the class of partially
observed Markov decision processes (POMDP) (Sondik
1971). In a POMDP the optimal policy only depends on the
agent’s belief state: the agent’s posterior distribution over the
hidden state of the system. In this case, this is a distribution
over the enforcement likelihood in the community. We give
our agent a beta prior over this parameter so that the belief
space for our agent is a two dimensional lattice equivalent to
Z2+. Initially, the belief state is (α0, β0). The probability that
the bystander is a punisher in the first game is
pαβ =
α
α+ β
.
Once the games begin, agents update their prior beliefs us-
ing Bayes’ rule, adding the counts of punishers and non-
punishers observed to the prior values. In the following, we
will use αi(βi) to represent the number of punishers (non-
punishers) observed prior to round i.
Theoretical Analysis: The Value of Dense
Normative Structure
Consider first the case in which the signaling cost, c, is zero.
In this case, punishers only face a risky choice when they
are assigned to the victim role in an important game. In all
other periods, the per-period expected payoff of playing the
risky arm is a constant 0.
Intuitively, the benefit of higher density of unimportant
games is that the agent is in a more information rich envi-
ronment. In general, this benefit trades off with the cost of
signalling. However, when the signalling cost is 0, a higher
density is strictly better. One way to show this is to consider
the value of perfect information (VPI): the additional utility
an agent can get in expectation when it has full information
compared with the expected utility with partial information
(Russell and Norvig 2010). We can show that, in the limit as
density goes to 1, VPI goes to 0; high density of unimportant
games essentially removes the agents’ uncertainty over the
proportion of punishers.
Proposition 2. If the participation cost, c, is 0, then, for any
belief state, (αi, βi), and discount rate γ, the corresponding
VPI goes to zero as density goes to 1. That is
lim
d→1
V PI((αi, βi); d, γ) = 0 (1)
Proof. (Sketch; see Appendix for details.) We consider a
policy such that the agent participates in order to observe
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Figure 2: Using the same graphical representation as Figure 1, here
we see a comparison of the robustness between groups of groups at
3 different density values. As the number of interactions increases,
the survival rate and average population size of groups with higher
silly rule density surpasses those of lower density groups.
τ(d) interactions. After τ(d) observations, it uses its best es-
timate of the probability of enforcement to decide if it should
leave. It doesn’t reconsider retiring or rejoining afterwards.
We show that this stopping time function can be chosen so
that the expected number of important games goes to 0, so
it doesn’t lose utility in expectation, while the total num-
ber of interactions (including silly games) goes to ∞, so it
makes the retirement decision with perfect information in
the limit.
It is straightforward to show that VPI is strictly positive as
long as P (V (θ) > 0) >  > 0 and P (V (θ) < 0) >  > 0
for some finite epsilon. Combined with our proposition, this
means that environments with more silly rules will be higher
value to agents; as the density of silly rules goes to 1, we
can neglect the utility lost due to partial information about
the proportion of punishers. Where participation costs can
be neglected, an agent will prefer an environment with lots
of silly rules.
Monte Carlo Experiments
To test the benefit of silly rules in groups composed of
our previously defined agents, we constructed a series of
simulation-based experiments in which we manipulated the
density of silly rules, cost of signaling, distribution of pun-
ishers, and prior beliefs about the punisher distribution. Each
simulation was carried out in a group of 100 agents, each
given the type of punisher or non-punisher. The simulations
were broken down into discrete periods, or group interac-
tions, in which each individual was matched with another
and engaged in an interaction, silly or important. We set the
reward for the victim in an important game to +1 in the case
in which the bystander is a punisher, and−1 if the bystander
is not. Note that given the symmetry in gains and losses
Figure 3: Using the same graphical representation as Figure 1 and
2, here we see a comparison of the adaptability between groups of
groups at 3 different density values. Given the unstable conditions
of the scenario, higher adaptability corresponds to faster a collapse
rate. Groups with high density are seen to collapse much faster than
those with low density.
in important games, continued participation in the group is
valuable if the likelihood that a bystander in an important
game is a punisher is greater than .5 Given the density-
adjusted discount factor for each simulation, the expected
reward of 10 interactions in a d = 0.9 environment would
be equivalent to that of 1 interaction in a d = 0.0 environ-
ment. This allows us to normalize the periods into timesteps,
where 1 timestep is equal to 11−d group interactions.
We are interested in the size of groups over time, as agents
make decisions about whether to remain in the group or not
given their interaction experience, as a function of the den-
sity of silly rules.
To establish a base case simulation, we first consider the
case in which there is low uncertainty about the proportion
of punishers in the group. We can think of this as the case in
which a stable group has engaged in interactions over a long
period of time and all agents have many observations of the
proportion of punishers in the group. We set θ, the punisher
proportion, to be 0.6 and the alpha-beta prior of the agents
to 30 : 20, which implies high confidence in the agents’ es-
timate of θ. Note that with this ground truth, group member-
ship is valuable, generating an expected payoff higher than
the alternative of 0. We then run the simulation for 1000
groups on the full factorial of 20 logistically scaled signal-
ing costs, c, and 20 linearly scaled densities, d. Doing so
confirms our first hypothesis (see Figure 1):
Hypothesis 1: When uncertainty about the proportion of
punishers in a group is low, the likelihood that a group loses
members and the likelihood the group collapses increases
with the density of silly rules.
In this case, as the frequency of the cost of signaling that
one is a punisher in silly interactions increases it begins to
outweigh the possible rewards from important interactions.
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We see that as cost goes up, groups with higher density of
silly interactions shrink and collapse more frequently than
those with low density. This confirms the intuition that silly
rules are costly if they serve no information function.
Group Robustness
Having established a baseline, we investigate the benefits of
silly rules for a group by considering different scenarios that
will stress test the robustness and adaptability of a group.
The first case we consider is one in which the individuals’
beliefs in a stable group are shocked, lowering their con-
fidence in the proportion of punishers. Concretely, this in-
volves setting the beta priors to 1.2 : 0.8 instead of 30 : 20.
Our hypothesis for the belief-shock scenario is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: For sufficiently low signaling cost, a higher
density of silly rules increases a group’s resilience to shocks
in individuals’ beliefs about the distribution of punishers.
As shown in Figure 2, in settings with low signaling cost,
high density allows for quick stabilization and strong indi-
vidual retention. Around 75% of groups with 0.9 density
persist after 250 timesteps, with an average population of
50. Compare this to the lower density groups, where the
groups that survive lose most members before stabilizing.
Group Adaptability
To test adaptability, we imagine an alternative scenario in
which the shock to individuals’ beliefs is accompanied by a
change in the ground truth about the proportion of punishers.
Concretely, we change the beta prior to 1.2 : 0.8 once again,
and set θ to be 0.4. With fewer punishers than non-punishers,
participation in the group generates a negative expected pay-
off, and agents would do better to leave the group. Put dif-
ferently, the group’s ruleset is no longer generating value for
group members. In a negative-value group such as this, we
define the adaptability of the group to be the rapidity of col-
lapse. Our hypothesis for this scenario is as follows:
Hypothesis 3: For sufficiently low signaling cost, a higher
density of silly rules allows for faster adaptation to negativer
shocks in the distribution of punishers in a group.
Looking to Figure 3, we find support for this hypothesis
in the experiments. After only a few timesteps, we see that
the high density groups are mostly collapsed, whereas the
lower density groups take quite a bit longer to peter out.
Discussion
Our results show that silly rules help groups adapt to un-
certainty about the stability of social order by enriching the
information environment. They help participants in these
groups track their beliefs about the likelihood that violations
of important rules will be punished, and thus the likelihood
that important rules will be violated. These beliefs are criti-
cal to the incentive to invest resources in interaction.
We focus on the punisher type of bystanders because
third-party punishment is the distinctive feature of human
groups (Riedl et al. 2012; Tomasello and Vaish 2013; Buck-
holtz and Marois 2012); it extends the range of actions that
can be deterred from those deterred by the reactions of the
victim alone to those that can be deterred by group punish-
ment (Boyd and Richerson 1992).
What are the lessons for AI alignment research? The goal
of AI alignment is the goal of building AI systems that act in
ways consistent with human values. For groups of humans,
this means (at least) values reflected in rules of behavior.
Discerning values from rules is complex: some rules reflect
important values, such as honoring a promise or avoiding
harm. Others do not reflect values that are important per se.
For an AI system to make good inferences and predictions
from observing normative behavior, then, it will need to dis-
tinguish between important rules and silly rules.
Failing to make this distinction could lead to at least two
key inferential errors. One error would be to treat impor-
tant and silly rules as equally likely to vary over time and
place. But important rules, because they promote function-
ality in human interactions, are likely to vary only when
there is some causal reason. Silly rules, on the other hand,
can vary for any reason, or none. Modelling the distinction
between silly and important rules is essential to accurately
learning rule systems. An AI system that lacks this distinc-
tion will over-estimate the likelihood of encountering cer-
tain types of normative behavior–with respect to dress codes,
for example–while under-estimating the likelihood of oth-
ers, such as speeding rules.
A second error that could result from a failure to distin-
guish between important and silly rules is that an AI system
is likely to treat all rules that it sees enforced as equally im-
portant to human values. This would produce a good solu-
tion in ordinary circumstances. But this will produce a poor
solution in circumstances in which it would be very costly to
comply with all the rules. If an AI system treats all of rules
as equally important to humans, it will presumably econo-
mize equally across the rules. But the better solution is to
prioritize important rules and compromise on silly rules.
The distinction between silly and important rules also
raises a question for work on human-robot interaction: how
important is it for an AI system to help enforce silly rules?
Our model brings out a legibility function in silly rules–they
make it easier for agents in a group that depends on third-
party enforcement to discern the stability of the rules in light
of uncertainty generated by changes in population or the en-
vironment. If artificial agents are interacting in these envi-
ronments and they don’t participate in enforcing silly rules,
what impact does that have on the beliefs of human agents?
Does the introduction of large numbers of artificial agents
who ignore silly rules into a human group (such as self-
driving cars into the group of humans driving on highways)
have the same impact on the robustness and adaptability of
the group as a decrease in the density of silly rules, by reduc-
ing the amount of information gained from the opportunity
to observe bystander behavior in interactions? Further still,
when a robot learns and enforces silly rules, do these seem-
ingly arbitrary norms become reified, fundamentally chang-
ing their meaning and reducing their signaling potential? We
leave these questions, and others, for future research.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proposition 1. Setting
γd = 1− (1− d)(1− γ)
ensures that the expected sum of discounted rewards from
important games is independent of d:
∀d,∈ [0, 1) Egj ,tO
 ∞∑
j=0
γjUV (gj , tO, tV )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ gj ∈ G′
 =
Egj ,tO
 ∞∑
j=0
I[gj ∈ G′]γjdU(gj , , tO, tV )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ d
 .
Proof. We first show that it is sufficient to ensure that the
expected value of γjd is the same given that j is a round with
an important game:
Egj ,tO
 ∞∑
j=0
I[gj ∈ G′]γjdU(gj , tO, tV )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ d

=
∞∑
j=0
Egj ,tO
[
I[gj ∈ G′]γjdU(gj , tO, tV )
∣∣∣ d]
=
∞∑
j=0
γjdEgj ,tO [U(gj , tO, tV )|d, gj ∈ G′]Egj [I[gj ∈ G′]|d]
= (1− d)EU
∞∑
j=0
γjd
where the first line holds by the linearity of expectation, the
fact that gj is an independent iid draw from a stationary dis-
tribution, and the constraint on the agent’s beliefs that tO is a
also an independent iid draw from a stationary distribution.
Substituting the form of the infinite geometric series, we see
that
EU
1− γ =
(1− d)EU
1− γd (2)
is sufficient to achieve our goal. Substituting the form for
γd in the theorem statement and reducing shows that this
condition is satisfied.
Proposition 2. If the participation cost, c, is 0, then, for any
belief state, (αi, βi), and discount rate γ, the corresponding
VPI goes to zero as density goes to 1. That is
lim
d→1
V PI((αi, βi); d, γ) = 0 (3)
Proof. Let V (θ) be the expected value of participating for-
ever, given θ. The optimal full information policy will retire
whenever V (θ) < 0 and has value V+(θ) = max{V (θ), 0}.
VPI is the difference between the expected value of V+
and the value of the optimal partial information policy
V ((αi, βi); d, γ):
V PI((αi, βi); d, γ) =
E [V+(θ)| (αi, βi)]− V ((αi, βi); d, γ) (4)
We proceed by lower bounding V . V is the value of the
optimal policy so it is weakly lower bounded by any arbi-
trary policy. We consider a policy that participates for
τ(d) =
1√
1− d (5)
rounds and then retires if E[V (θ)] < 0. This choice of τ
ensures that
lim
d→1
τ(d) =∞; (6)
lim
d→1
∑
t<τ(d)
P (gt ∈ G) = lim
d→1
1− d√
1− d
= 0.
(7)
(6) ensures that, as density goes to 1, then agent’s estimate
of participation value when it decides, E[V (θ)] converges to
V (θ) by consistency. (7) ensures that the expected number
of important games (and thus opportunities to lose utility
against a full information agent) goes to 0. This is sufficient
to show that
lim
d→1
V ((αi, βi); d, γ) = E[V+(θ)|(αi, βi)] (8)
which shows the result.
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